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Advances in digital technologies, such as smart sensors, force public and private 
organisations to develop their information processing capabilities. Outsourcing increases 
organisations’ dependence on partners for information required for decision-making, 
making inter-organisational governance (i.e. contractual and relational mechanisms) an 
important lever for organisational information processing. We theoretically ground and 
empirically validate how inter-organisational governance helps to address information 
asymmetry that arises when capturing information using digital technologies. Using 
Organisational Information Processing Theory as our theoretical lens, we conduct four 
in-depth cases in the Dutch infrastructure sector. We provide evidence on the importance 
of fit between information processing requirements and governance mechanisms 
employed.  
 




In General Management studies, and Operations and Supply Chain Management (OSCM) 
specifically, information technology has long been regarded as an important enabler of 
information and process integration within organisations and across supply chain actors 
alike (Ivanov et al., 2019; Kache & Seuring, 2017). The emergence of ICT-based 
disruptive technologies, such as big data (analytics) and smart sensors, digitally transform 
supply chains (i.e. Industry 4.0; Harris et al., 2015). Such technologies are often 
characterised as changing the bases of competition by changing the performance metrics 
along which organisations compete (Danneels, 2004).  
This development affects both public and private sector organisations. In public-
private collaborations, which emerge when a public body leverages a private partner’s 
resources and competencies for the purpose of public sector management (Caldwell et al., 
2017), disruptive technologies are not yet adopted at a large scale (Van de Kerkhof et al., 
2018). Where such technologies have been adopted, disparate data collection and 
analyses at both the public body and its private-sector suppliers may result in information 
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asymmetry between them. Information sharing would address this asymmetry, but is 
usually difficult to organise because of misaligned goals, incentives and organisational 
practices. The effective deployment of contractual and/or relational governance 
mechanisms is thus required to coordinate collaboration more generally (Rangan et al., 
2006), and information processing activities at both organisations in particular.  
A consideration of the roles that contractual and relational governance mechanisms 
play in addressing information asymmetries during the implementation of disruptive 
technologies in inter-organisational relationships (IORs) addresses several gaps in prior 
governance and technology transformation literatures. First, while prior work argues that 
the implementation of digital technologies results in huge increases in technical and 
commercial information (e.g. Kache & Seuring, 2017), limited prior work has explored 
in detail how such transformations lead to changes in the management of: (i) collecting, 
(ii) processing, and (iii) transferring information, between partners (Roßmann et al., 
2018), nor what information asymmetry this may lead to. Developing a more detailed 
understanding of the degrees, types and forms of data-sharing taking place in inter-
organisational relationships is crucial to support digital transformation. Second, prior 
studies offer very limited insights into how contractual and relational (i.e. trust, relational 
norms) governance mechanisms may be effectively used to support information 
collection, transformation and distribution in inter-organisational relationships (Kache & 
Seuring, 2017), and thus manage information asymmetry. 
We therefore study how organisations manage information asymmetry that emerges in 
IORs as a result of digital transformation. More specifically, we draw on Organisational 
Information Processing Theory, OIPT (Galbraith, 1974), and conduct four in-depth case 
studies of public-private partnerships (PPPs) implementing disruptive technologies to 
answer the following research question: In public-private collaborations undergoing 
digital transformation, how do contractual and relational governance mechanisms affect 
information asymmetry through the acquisition, transformation and subsequent 
dissemination of information? 
We contribute to extent work in two primary ways. First, building on OIPT, we draw 
out the various key activities, namely collection, sense-making and transferring 
information, when partnering organisations seek to address information asymmetry. 
While prior work has used OIPT in mainly intra-organisational settings, limited work has 
used the theory to explore inter-organisational information exchanges (exceptions include 
Bode et al., 2011; Dahlmann & Roehrich, 2020). Second, we contribute to supply chain 
governance literature by empirically studying the role of governance in IORs undergoing 
digital transformation. More specifically, we show how contractual and relational 
governance are deployed in IORs for acquisition, transformation and dissemination 
purposes, and to what effects. This is a vital area of future research as the effective 
management of inter-organisational relationships across the supply chain is paramount 
for organisations’ survival, requiring governance mechanisms that support the need to 
mitigate information asymmetry.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we review relevant literature 
on digital transformation, OIPT and IOR governance. Subsequently, we elaborate our 
research approach after which we turn to our findings. We then conclude and discuss 
scientific and managerial implications.  
 
Theoretical background 
Digital transformation, as enabled by the recent emergence of disruptive technologies, 
changes paradigms, principles and models in SCM (Ivanov et al., 2019). Various base 
technologies (i.e. the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud services, and big data and analytics) 
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enable a wide-range of front-end technologies along four dimensions: Smart 
Manufacturing (e.g. machine-to-machine communication), Smart Products (e.g. 
product’s monitoring), Smart Supply Chains (e.g. digital platforms with SC partners), and 
Smart Working (e.g. remote monitoring and operations of production) (Frank et al., 
2019). Potential applications are many, for example in forecasting and inventory 
management at manufacturers and retailers (Waller & Fawcett, 2013). Another area of 
application concerns maintenance, where disruptive technologies are important enablers 
for predictive or condition-based maintenance (Sakib & Wuest, 2018).  
The large amounts of technical and commercial data generated by these technologies 
provide ample opportunities for organisations to improve their productivity, as well as 
more fundamentally to transform their business and processes not only internally, but also 
with external partners (Roßmann et al., 2018). However, this requires organisations to 
carry out information processing activities, such as acquiring data, transforming data into 
information, and communicating & storing information effectively (Rosado Feger, 2014).  
OIPT (Bode et al, 2011; Galbraith, 1974) argues that organisations manage 
environmental uncertainty by deploying information-processing mechanisms that best 
address the amount and type of information asymmetry they are faced with. Information 
asymmetry is characterised as the absence of information (i.e. information uncertainty), 
or as the messiness or ambiguity of information (i.e. information equivocality). 
Information uncertainty may refer to a lack in quantity as well as quality of information 
needed to perform tasks (Galbraith, 1974; Zhao et al., 2011). The more uncertainty an 
organisation is exposed to, the more information needs to be gathered and processed to 
realise a given performance level (Bode et al., 2011). Equivocality, in turn, describes 
situations in which information is messy and ambiguous, leading to potentially conflicting 
interpretations and a lack of understanding (Daft & Lengel, 1986).Whereas collecting 
more data helps managers mitigate information uncertainty, equivocality requires 
managers’ cognitive skills to make sense of the data, thus ordering and presenting 
information in a logical way. This is particularly true when the information required is ill 
structured, difficult to evaluate and requires more than one individual for their 
interpretation. (Daft & Lengel, 1986). 
Information processing is hence considered essential to ‘bridge disagreement and 
diversity’ (Daft & Lengel, 1986) between two (or more) organisations that have different 
objectives and values as predominant, for example, in public-private relationships 
(Caldwell et al., 2017). Information processing complexity increases when a focal 
organisation’s supply chain partners are involved, as is the case in outsourcing 
relationships. At the same time, the interactions between partnering organisations may be 
conducive to generate more information (which is further supported by digital 
technology), making effective information processing, as characterised by the three key 
stages of information gathering, interpreting and transferring, even more critical. 
Surprisingly, the majority of research adopts OIPT for intra-organisational issues (e.g. 
Turner & Makhija, 2012), making our insights into the application of OIPT to inter-
organisational settings such as in focus in our research fairly limited. (Busse et al., 2017). 
Moreover, research by Kache and Seuring (2017) indicated that governance, i.e. the 
orchestration of digitalisation-related efforts across dyads and the collaboration rules this 
calls for, ranks first on the list of supply chain-level digitalisation challenges (4.33 
importance score on a 5-point Likert scale). However, extent work offers little 
understanding of the roles that contractual (i.e. legally binding agreements that specify 
roles and obligations of contracting parties; Lyons & Mehta, 1997) and relational (i.e. the 
strength of the social norms present in an exchange situation; Ferguson et al., 2005) 
mechanisms play in addressing information asymmetry during digital transformation. 
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Following the seminal work by Tushman and Nadler (1978, p. 617) who note that 
“different organisational structures have different capacities for effective information 
processing”, we now consider contractual and relational governance mechanisms, and 
their capacity to address information asymmetry in inter-organisational relationships. 
Contractual governance and its associated mechanisms influence the processing of 
information through a range of different elements, including rules, operating procedures, 
planning, and incentive systems (Lumineau, 2017). Contracts can stipulate information 
gathering by explicitly including control and coordination clauses that require 
information exchange (including type, frequency and quality) between contracting parties 
(Faems et al, 2008; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). These clauses can also include the clauses 
on the frequency of meetings between organisations’ key decision makers (Mesquita & 
Brush, 2008; Susarla et al. 2010). Information exchange can furthermore be encouraged 
by issuing appropriate incentive schemes. In addition to the gathering of information, 
contracts influence the way information is interpreted and how organisations make sense 
of its importance (Daft & Weick, 1984). Coordination mechanisms may facilitate 
information processing by encouraging a cohesive interpretation of objectives (Puranam 
et al., 2006). Finally, contractual mechanisms influence the synthesis of information, that 
is, the ability to develop linkages and understand interconnections among different pieces 
of information, frequently using contracts as knowledge repositories reflecting on 
changes in the relationship (Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Zheng et al., 2008). 
Relational governance and its mechanisms (i.e. trust, relational norms), in turn, may 
influence the processing of information through social processes (Heide & Miner, 1992; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In the presence of trust, parties will be more likely to expend 
efforts into gathering information. A trusting culture in supply chains furthermore leads 
to higher levels of information exchange across parties (Kache & Seuring, 2017); Ghosh 
& Fedorowicz, 2008). Finally, the free flow of information under trust allows for 
enhanced synthesis of information. Relational norms refer to the shared expectations 
about the behaviours of partners involved in an IOR (Cannon et al., 2000; Heide & John, 
1990), and imply a bilateral expectation that parties will proactively provide useful 
information to their partner in support of the ongoing relationship. Norms of information 
exchange, solidarity and participation (Heide & John, 1992) thus address behavioural 
expectations in ongoing, present-day relationships. Information exchange is the 
expectation that parties will freely and actively provide useful information, which leads 
partners to solicit and exchange private information often (Carson & John, 2013; Heide 
& John, 1992). Solidarity is a feeling of mutuality (Jap & Ganesan, 2000) which leads 
partners to treat problems that arise in a collaborative way. Consequently, both will feel 
the need for gathering and sharing relevant information. Finally, participation refers to 
bilateral expectations regarding decision-making and goal setting (Dwyer & Oh, 1988), 
based on joint analysis and interpretation of information.  
Our in-depth, multiple case studies will shed light on the roles of both governance 
mechanisms in addressing information asymmetry during digital transformation.  
 
Approach 
We conducted in-depth, multiple case studies, because this allowed us to address the 
question of how contractual and relational governance mechanisms address information 
asymmetry in public-private relationships through the acquisition, transformation and 
subsequent dissemination of information as part of digital transformation. This method 
yielded multiple observations of complex contract design and relational governance 
challenges (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007). 
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We purposively sampled four inter-organisational exchange relationships that had 
implemented disruptive technologies, and that were characterised by information 
asymmetry between (semi-)public organisations and their private partners. These 
included established relationships with contractual and relational governance in place. 
Our four cases come from two (semi-)public organisations, and involve differing 
information processing challenges, i.e., differing levels of information uncertainty and 
equivocality. The research context is that of public bodies managing critical 
infrastructures (i.e. roads and waterways, and water management; railways) in the 
Netherlands. These public bodies have outsourced the maintenance of these 
infrastructures to private contractors. Disruptive technologies have been adopted for the 
purpose of enhanced asset management and maintenance. Table 1 provides important 
details on the two (semi-) public organisations and the four cases, including interview 
evidence supporting our assessments of uncertainty and equivocality in the cases. 
We put a great deal of effort into gathering reliable and objective data from our 
informants (Alvesson, 2003) and interviewed various stakeholders with different lengths 
of tenure in disparate hierarchical and functional roles, to access diverse perspectives that 
allowed us to triangulate data. This resulted in ten interviews at each organisation with 
asset managers/asset specialists and area managers (asset management perspective), 
configuration managers and data scientists (data perspective), and contract managers 
(outsourcing perspective). To minimise respondents’ biases (Golden, 1992), we designed 
an interview protocol that we adapted to the characteristics of different informants and 
refined over time as the research progressed and theoretical constructs emerged. Overall, 
twenty hours of interview data was collected and transcribed. Data collection happened 
in real-time, i.e. during the ongoing public-private relationship (October 2018-December 
2019). Moreover, 22 documents have been analysed (seventeen at Road and five at Rail) 
in total, including contracts, documents describing visions on smart maintenance, project 
documents, and official reports. We gathered data until we reached an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation and new data collection did not 
provide any fresh and relevant information for the development of new insights (i.e. data 
saturation). The quality and rigour of the case studies was ensured by applying specific 
criteria and measures that address construct validity, internal validity, external validity, 
and reliability issues (Yin, 2013).  
Data coding and analysis took place in parallel with data collection following 
recommendations by Barratt et al. (2011) and Miles and Huberman (1994). Data was 
coded in Atlas.ti using a list of provisional categories (i.e. information acquisition/ 
transformation/dissemination, and contractual and relational governance), but 
increasingly included additional themes and codes as they emerged from the interviews 
(e.g. “organisational readiness” and “management support”). Open codes (e.g. “data 
requirements”, “bonus”, “penalty”, and “contractor behaviour”) were assigned to excerpts 
of the interview transcripts and contracts. Next, these were grouped into higher-order 
categories (e.g. “contract design” and “incentive schemes”) using axial coding 
procedures. Overall, data analysis was an iterative process with codes being refined by 




Table 1 - Case Characteristics 
 Road 
Governmental agency responsible for main roads and waterways in the 
Netherlands. 
Rail 
Private limited liability organisation (fully government-owned) 
responsible for the railways in the Netherlands. 
 Case E Case Y Case S Case N 
Contractor 
Details 
Consortium consisting of (1) a 
large international contractor 
specialised in electro-technical 
installations and (2) an equally 
large international contractor 
specialised in construction. 
Consortium consisting of (1) a 
larger international contractor 
specialised in electro-technical 
installations and (2) a smaller 
national contractor specialised in 
construction. 
Large international contractor 
specialised in construction and 
maintenance of railroad systems. 
Medium-sized national contractor 
specialised in construction and 
maintenance of railroad systems. 
Contract 
   - Scope 
Includes maintenance of an 
important waterway corridor 
connecting the eastern part of the 
Netherlands with Germany.  
Includes maintenance of an 
important waterway corridor 
connecting inland waterways with 
the North Sea. 
Includes maintenance of a major 
railway connection between two 
large cities in the middle and 
southern part of the Netherlands. 
Includes the maintenance of the 
railway connections to the east of 
the most central train station in the 
Netherlands. 
   - Type Locally customised performance-
based contract. 
Locally customised contract with 
performance & behaviour aspects. 
Centrally led performance-based 
contract. 
Centrally led performance-based 
contract. 
   - Duration 5 years (option for two 1-year extensions). 5 years (with extension option if new public tender is delayed). 
Relationship 
Length 
No prior relationship with either contractor. No prior relationship. Second consecutive contract with 
this contractor. 




 Contractor’s inspection reports. 
 Road’s operating systems for moving assets (such as sluices). 
 Road and contractor’s asset management systems.  
 Sensors. 
 Dedicated inspection trains (equipped with cameras and sensors). 
 Contractor’s inspection reports. 
 Rail’s asset management system. 
Uncertainty High as data and information is insufficient or of low quality: 
   “I hope that we can indicate the information needs we have to the [IT 
dept.] and that they deliver this information” – Asset Manager (E). 
   “In the future, we need to be able to look back in the analysis and ensure 
that it can provide us with enough information, and not just things like 
‘finished’, ‘button pressed’, etc.” – Contract Manager (Y). 
Low as data and information is controlled by Rail: 
   “We receive data from inspection trains from other departments, for 
example” – Area Manager (S). 
   “So that is a system where we just share the data, because they see 
everything in it, but I see that too” – Assistant Area Manager (N). 
Equivocality Low due to more intensive collaboration with contractors: 
   “What I would also like to see is that market parties realise that by 
jointly working on this type of information, they can also organise the 
maintenance process much more efficiently” – Asset Manager (E). 
   “So what do they need to do it [maintenance] well and what do we need 
to manage it well? Well that is how you work together. So it should no 
longer be a blaming game” – Configuration Manager (Y) 
High due to issues with handling large amounts of data: 
   “It [current state of rail tracks] is all good and we are doing pretty well 
in terms of failures. But I also don’t have everything in sight and neither 
do the inspectors” – Regional Contract Manager (S). 
   “Well there has been a lot of budget cuts and there are now only 1 or 2 
people in our region. I believe there is only one left. He has to do it all 




Hereafter, we highlight the main findings for the four cases. As each set of cases involves 
the same asset owner, we opt for descriptions at the level of the case company, weaving 
together the findings of both cases. This reduces repetition and allows us to elaborate on 
similarities and important differences. In the discussion, we highlight how and to what 
extent the two case companies, in each of their cases, use contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms to organise the acquisition, transformation and dissemination of 
information. We then discuss these findings in relation to information uncertainty and 
equivocality. Key observations and corresponding quotes are listed in Table 2. 
Regarding information acquisition, Road’s contracts clearly stipulate that they own the 
data, and that the contractor should share any data they collect (related to maintenance 
times, materials used, etc.) with fixed intervals. Incentive schemes have been put in place, 
including penalties for not sharing data. However, evidence suggests efforts to share data 
outweigh the penalties by far, causing contractors to accept penalties instead. The (in-) 
compatibility of systems also contributes to acquisition problems. Due to configurational 
differences, information entered in the contractor’s system cannot be directly transferred 
to Road’s system without losing part of it. Overall, the contract seems to need more 
specific provisions regarding information sharing. Furthermore, Road feels that the 
contractors are not fully open. This stems from the past when Road followed a ‘market 
unless’ strategy, leaving everything related to the maintenance of assets to market parties. 
However, recently Road, learned this led to a hollowed out maintenance organisation and 
loss of control over its assets. Road therefore changed to a ‘together with’ strategy, in 
which they pursue the optimisation of asset maintenance together with contractors. As 
such, Road increasingly relies on relational mechanisms aimed at joint goal setting, and 
requiring intensive information exchange. Nevertheless, it still seems to be influenced by 
its traditional tendency to develop relationships with contractors that are more 
transactional in nature making it difficult to achieve relationships that are more open. 
Road is not fully able to transform data all by itself. This is due to a technical 
shortcoming since its system does not support the 3D format provided by its contractors. 
The loss of knowledge regarding maintenance during the ‘market unless’ period further 
complicates the ability of Road to transform information. To address this issue, Road has 
started to develop a vision to help identify exact information needs of its departments. 
For this, they tap into the expertise of their contractors as well, and both parties aim to 
jointly determine what transformations need to be performed and by whom.  
The dissemination of information also benefits from the shift to focus on collaborating 
with market parties. Road now acknowledges that combining information from both 
organisations can actually have complementary effects. This collaborative focus drives 
Road to develop stronger relationships with its contractors, and therefore more actively 
communicates with its contractors to disseminate information. This includes information 
about failure profiles of assets and the use of assets by end customers. A lack of flexibility 
in the current contracts, however, makes it rather difficult for Road to incorporate 
innovations. Current contracts are rather descriptive and, once signed, additions 
(including innovations) to the contracts are not allowed. Therefore, innovations often 
have to be put on hold until the current contract period has ended. 
At Rail, there is a strong focus on collecting data internally. As part of the data can 
only be collected by its maintenance contractors, Rail’s contracts stipulate that contractors 
need to share data either on fixed intervals (e.g. monthly inspection reports regarding the 
state of assets) or upon request (e.g. if an unexpected failure occurred to determine to 
what extent this could have been prevented by the contractor). However, our evidence 
suggests that Rail does not monitor the contractual requirements consistently due to 
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internal capacity constraints with respect to its workforce. Contractors seem to notice 
quite quickly what is and what is not checked by Rail’s employees, and tend to share only 
those pieces of data that are under scrutiny. On top of that, contractors seem to be hesitant 
to share data with Rail due to the transactional nature of the relationship. Contractors 
seem to feel that the data they share is mainly used to evaluate their performance, which 
leads them to only share data if needed (Rail actively checks whether it is received) or if 
the data is favourable for the contractor (the data that is not actively checked by Rail). 
Rail aims to perform the majority of the information transformation activities 
internally. However, it seems that internal as well as external challenges influence the 
transformation. Internally, due to several past budget cuts, Rail is now short on staff that 
is trained to transform the data they have. Rail also experiences challenges with data that 
is incomplete or only received after explicit requests to contractors, due to insufficient 
monitoring and enforcement of information sharing clauses. Additionally, contractors 
perform a small part of the transformation, as they are contractually obliged by Rail to 
prove their performance. Rail’s monthly evaluation of the contractors’ maintenance 
performance is partially based on the information provided by the contractors in their own 
evaluation reports in which the contractors use maintenance data to substantiate claims. 
Rail seems to focus on controlling the dissemination of information through 
contractual agreements. Rail’s contracts actually stipulate which organisation should 
report what information, and what the other partner should do with it. Rail seems to invest 
less in relational governance to help with the dissemination of information. This seems 
partially motivated by the fear of being too open, thereby revealing evidence that neither 
parties is fully compliant with the agreements made in the contracts. This in turn may lead 
to disputes between Rail and its contractors, but also with other potential contractors that 
did not win one of the contracts. 
Looking at how Road manages information asymmetry, the ‘messiness’ of its data and 
information seems to be managed rather well (i.e. low equivocality). After years of 
leaving maintenance completely to their contractors, Road now actively collaborates with 
its contractors to regain knowledge about their assets. This helps Road to understand its 
data and information needs, and how to use it, better. However, Road faces rather high 
levels of information uncertainty. Uncertainty is primarily present during the acquisition 
of data. Even though the contracts stipulate that contractors must share data, the current 
incentive schemes seem to act as a barrier. Uncertainty is also present during data 
transformation due to internal struggles (determining the exact information needs) and 
technical challenges (related to the quality of data provided by contractors). While an 
open relationship seems to lower uncertainty to some extent, at Road, uncertainty is 
largely due to the current contractual mechanisms in place. The contracts do not possess 
efficient incentive schemes to motivate data sharing, nor do they possess clear agreements 
with respect to the (technical) specifications of what data must be shared and how.  
Rail manages to lower its information uncertainty by focusing on contractual control. 
Through its current contractual governance mechanisms, Rail clearly described where the 
data should come from, who should transform what data, and finally who should receive 
the transformed information in the end. Although uncertainty is low, Rail is still 
confronted with incomplete or missing data, due to inconsistency in monitoring to extent 
to which contractors meet contractual requirements with respect to data and enforcing it. 
Using contracts to reduce the messiness of information (i.e. equivocality) as well seems 
to be only marginally effective at Rail. For example, although Rail contractually obliged 
its contractors to perform some information transformation, contractors tend to do so only 
when it is explicitly requested by Rail. There is no open relationship just yet, and 
proactive information sharing and mutual learning opportunities are lacking.  
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Table 2 - Influence of contractual and relational governance on information processing activities. 
 Contractual Governance Relational Governance 
Acquisition Contracts stipulate that Road owns the data; contractors should share: 
“[…] we have one main objective. We call it ‘making the ABC’ of the 
area. Improve the quality of data” – Asset Manager 2 (E). 
“The Contractor must deliver Area data once maintenance is 
completed, so that [Road] can perform proper management of its 
Area” – Contract Document (Y) 
Incentive schemes not effective for getting all the data: 
“They do get a penalty, but that is sometimes much less than what they 
can save if they do nothing” – Asset Specialist (Y). 
Contractors seem to be hesitant to share all data related to performed 
maintenance activities: 
“But they do not put all their cards on the table. It is true.” – 
Configuration Manager (Y).  
Through opening up, Road aims to improve communication and mutual 
understanding: 
“And I think that the other part is mainly a matter of creating good 
connections and agreeing on what you are going to do” – Data 
Scientist (E).  
Rail’s contracts stipulate that contractors share data upon request: 
“If one of our inspectors has been outside and comes back with the 
message ‘that doesn’t look good’, we [Rail] can request all their 
inspection reports” – Assistant Area Manager (S). 
Contract enforcement has been deteriorating: 
“Only enforcing it, that needs to tightened, because the department 
that enforced it has been halved” – Assistant Area Manager (N). 
Contractors seem to be hesitant to be fully open to Rail: 
“But they [contractor] also see things outside that we [Rail] have not 
seen that they are not going to report. That is just how it works” – 
Regional Contract Manager (S). 
Transformation Missing information and misaligned contractual agreements hamper 
transformation by Road: 
“The information is described in the description field, but that is not 
in the form of data. So if you want to analyse that, you have to search 
in the text boxes and have to organise that first ” – Asset Manager (Y) 
“The biggest problem is that local information needs and [general] 
contract requirements do not match. If you have specified your needs, 
the contract should accommodate these” – Config. Manager (Y) 
Road seeks collaboration to unlock information: 
“What I would also like to see is that market parties realise that by 
jointly working on this type of information, they can also organise 
maintenance process much more efficiently” – Asset Manager 1 (E). 
“That is our pilot. That they process all malfunctions directly in our 
system” – Asset Manager (Y). 
Rail requires some transformed information from contractors: 
“They often have to demonstrate on a monthly basis, by means of data, 
that the requirements we set in the contract, that they meet them” – 
Area Manager (N). 
Rails contractors tend to avoid doing too much: 
“Then the contractor’s way of working: I don’t deliver this, I don’t 
deliver that and that. I’ll see if I hear something [from Rail]”- 
Regional Contract Manager (N). 
Dissemination Road wishes to share information with external parties other than their 
current contractors; current contract does not facilitate that: 
“But we want to be able to pass that data on to the next contractor” – 
Asset Manager 1 (E).   
Road seeks to enhance current relationships through sharing 
information with their partners: 
“We are not only knowledge seekers, but also knowledge bearers. So 
we can also return knowledge to them” – Configuration Manager (Y). 
Rail specifies clauses with respect to data usage: 
“There is a certain clause in the PBC contract that clearly states that 
this and this must be reported by [contractor] to [Rail], and then [Rail] 
must act on it” – Assistant Area Manager (N). 
Transparency may lead non-compliance with tender regulations leading 
Rail and its contractors to refrain from sharing all information: 
“Transparency is not desirable. Maybe not from [Rail] either, but I 




Disruptive ICT-based technologies driving the digital transformation of IORs force 
organisations to reconsider their information processing activities. Limited attention has 
been paid to the roles that contractual and relational governance mechanisms play in 
organising information processing activities in IORs undergoing digital transformation. 
Our in-depth multiple case studies provide several insights into how mechanisms of 
contractual and relational governance are deployed to govern the three key activities 
identified by OIPT, and to manage information asymmetry. 
First, while information gathering and sharing activities can be made explicit and can 
be stipulated in contracts, transformation and dissemination seem to make a larger appeal 
to informal safeguards such as trust. Our cases highlighted the existence of specific 
contractual clauses related to information gathering and sharing, but that these clauses 
could be more specific (e.g. format, level of detail, etc.) and that incentive schemes 
needed adjustment if information gathering and sharing was to arrive at the desired levels. 
In contrast, transformation activities need a clear perspective from both partners on what 
kind of information is required, for what purpose, and by whom. This requires more 
intensive collaboration, in the form of joint goal setting and decision-making (Dwyer & 
Oh, 1988), which may successfully be achieved by developing relational norms. Trust 
also plays and important role here, as parties need some certainty that their openness will 
not be taken advantage of by the other partner (Birkel & Hartmann, 2019). 
Secondly, we found that due to its focus on information gathering and transformation, 
contractual governance seems most effective in reducing information uncertainty. In 
contrast, relational governance seems most fruitful to tackle equivocality, as the exchange 
of information is part of joint problem-solving, and decision making helps to develop the 
cognitive skills of individual decision makers and information structuring and evaluation 
processes. This suggests the need for different governance approaches depending on the 
nature and level of information asymmetry between collaborating organisations. A one-
size-fits-all approach will not bring the desired results. Consequently, organisations may 
simultaneously address information uncertainty and equivocality by deploying 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms respectively. Additionally, findings 
show that organisations do not have to target uncertainty and equivocality simultaneously 
to lower information asymmetry, nor have to address these in a specific order. 
For managers, this research offers insights into how organisational information-
processing activities can be organised in inter-organisational dyads that are confronted 
with increasing amounts of data resulting from the adoption of disruptive technologies. 
Additionally, it provides insights in the way contractual as well as relational governance 
help to coordinate the three information-processing activities within relationships. 
Specific limitations aside, this research has shown how contractual and relational 
governance may be deployed in IORs for acquisition, transformation and dissemination 
purposes, and to what effects. As such, we offer a first important step in a vital research 
area, i.e. how governance mechanisms may support the digital transformation of IORs.  
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